There are two types of sanctions policy. The first is a set of measures designed to show diplomatic displeasure, but foreshadowing no real expansion of sanctions or escalation of tension. This was the case with United States sanctions against China after suppression of the Tiananmen demonstrations and United States sanctions against Pakistan for its nuclear weapons policies. The second type is a set of measures designed to force strategic submission by an opposing state through the progressive expansion and tightening of sanctions. This was the case with the international sanctions against South Africa intended to force it to end the apartheid policies. 

Sanctions are a form of coercion. They may not be intended by the perpetrators to signal an intent for war, and are most often not conceived with that end point in mind.  Nevertheless, there are situations where economic sanctions are understood to be a less lethal option in the range of instruments that states should apply to exhaust all peaceful means before a decision for war is made. There are also situations where, regardless of the intent of the perpetrators, the sanctioned state will see the pressure as an act of war and respond accordingly, thus setting in train a countdown for war or some other form of military clash if the sanctions are not lifted. Once the countdown is set in motion, regardless of who does it and which side is right, the policy dynamics become those of crisis management. 

The parallels are far from exact, but this was more or less the case with the Cuban missile crisis. 

What type of sanctions policy do we now have in place against Iran? Regardless of intent or who is right, we are now clearly in the escalatory type, in a crisis management mode to prevent war. This was already the case before the political drama associated with the Iranian naval exercise in the Strait of Hormuz in late December 2011. The rhetoric from Iran on this occasion was in one sense overblown, but it should not mask the seriousness with which the Iranian leaders approach this. The alleged plot by Iranian officials to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador in the United States, if true, would be a very solid indicator of just how serious the crisis is viewed in Tehran. 

More importantly, the alleged plot is a better indicator of where to look for possible Iranian breakout strategies than the recent naval exercise might be. The place to look is the realm of covert operations. Iran has two options: one is in direct agitation of militia allies in Iraq and Lebanon, or staging of provocations in expatriate work forces in the neighboring Arab states. A second option is in the area of cyber operations. The Iranian Cyber Army, to all intents and purposes an unofficial group, does have ties to the government. The countries applying the sanctions on Iran are deeply vulnerable in the cyber domain.

Another area to look, in the diplomatic domain, may be to the relationship with Pakistan. If I was an Iranian leader, I would be working hard to forge a new strategic alliance with Pakistan, now so severely estranged from its ally, the United States.

Whatever the choice, one thing is certain. The Iranian leaders are reviewing their crisis response options. These options probably have little to do with nuclear policies or nuclear talks with the EU. The question is this: are the leaders who are making sanctions decisions in the EU ready for this emerging crisis? Are they fully briefed on Iranian breakout options and the risks?