An unprecedented and massive Top Secret study commissioned in 1974 by the United States Secretary of Defense and completed only in 1981 may carry some lessons for President Obama as he contemplates the sharp reactions to recent military measures against Iran and China.
The super secret report found that the Pentagon and its Soviet counterpart were not in an arms race as classically understood. The report, finalized in 1981 by the time President Reagan came to office, found that except possibly in two or three instances, both countries did not make their decisions to deploy new military technologies based on a specific strategic responses to systems deployed by the other side. The main drivers of the decisions of each side were self-referential: technological feasibility (let’s build and deploy it because we can) and the preferences of military doctrine (let’s build and deploy it because we want to).
The provenance of this Top Secret study should not be overlooked. The lead authors and scores of participants had full access to the United States intelligence record on the Soviet Union and more unusually, full access to the classified records of the United States government on its decision making.
According to one of the lead authors of that study, evidence subsequently obtained by US intelligence agencies indicates that the United States did not correctly assess just how stretched the USSR was economically even in the 1960s and 1970s. The consequence was, he says, that the United States missed clear signals form the Soviet leaders that they wanted to stop the wasteful and excessive arms build-ups on both sides much earlier.
What are the lessons for Obama from this study? Of course, the President is correct to pursue both political and military strategies toward Iran and China. Kissinger warned in his famous work on Diplomacy, that the United States should always talk the talk of Wilsonian idealism while carrying the big stick of Rooseveltian realism.
The deployment of anti-missile assets in the Persian Gulf region that was announced this past week appears to make sense from several military and political points of view. It will provide actual physical defense (only partial) against possible Iranian missile attacks on countries allied to the United States. It will provide political reassurance (only partial) that the United States commitment to contain the possible path of Iranian missile development is solid.
Similarly, it is not hard to justify the arms sales to Taiwan. As part of its commitment to peaceful resolution of the political and sovereignty dispute between Beijing and Taipei, the United States believes it must help Taiwan maintain a defensive capability against the possibility of military coercion or direct attack by China.
The lesson from the Top Secret Study of over three decades ago is that the President must always apply two tests in taking military measures that others see as a threat. First, are we doing this because we can or, rather, are we doing it because we must? This would mean that he, as Commander in Chief, has decided on its absolute necessity after a comprehensive study of political and military options to address the strategic conflict in question. Second, are we doing it because we want to do it or, rather, because we know it will have the desired effect? Have we communicated to the other side (in this case Iran and China) what effect we expect it to have on them and discussed it with them?
Military measures in tense political situations must be part of a comprehensive diplomatic plan that includes negotiating benchmarks and clear escalation/de-escalation plans with concrete outcomes in mind. The plan and intended effects, including incentives or disincentives for intended response, must be communicated to the other party. We must ensure that we have listened to their responses and understood them correctly.
One gets the impression that both decisions – for deploying anti-missile assets in the Persian Gulf and arms sales package for Taiwan – were made without passing these sorts of tests. The challenge for the United States is how to avoid the appearance of one-sided military diplomacy and to engage in sustained and intense dialogue with strategic leaders in such countries as Iran and China in a way that produces mutually acceptable solutions.