Homegrown terrorism is a new phenomenon, so we need to re-think how we respond to it. International security cooperation, border controls and transport sector monitoring are all important, but they don’t go far enough.
What is also needed is to identify radical tendencies within Europe’s Muslim communities and devise strategies to counteract them. Intercultural communication is seen as the best way to break down prejudices and negative clichés and to prevent radicalisation and recruitment to jihad of members of the Muslim communities. For this to be successful, it is important to first clarify what it is that can turn someone into a jihadi. One common pattern that emerges is that because it promises meaning and identity, the jihadi message seems to appeal particularly to people who are unsure about who they are and where they are heading.
Last year a study of Germany’s Muslim community revealed a consistently close link between radicalisation and “vicarious” experiences of marginalisation and discrimination. A critical factor was the powerful emotions generated by US-led military interventions in Muslim countries, and by the situation of the Palestinians.
But the study showed there was no automatic correlation between condoning the use of violence and having Islamist sympathies. The authors also noted that the mechanisms that turn Muslims into potential terrorists are the same as those that make German teenagers and young adults susceptible to xenophobic propaganda and right-wing extremism. The study’s main findings have been largely corroborated by a Gallup study based on a large-scale survey of the world’s Muslim population.
According to Gallup, only seven percent are politically radical and condone the use of violence, their motives are not so much religious as inspired by the demeaning treatment Muslims are perceived to suffer politically and socially. Certain aspects of the host country environment may contribute to radicalisation, but external factors also play a major role.
Muslims’ attitudes towards their host country are strongly influenced by the perception that Muslims in general are subjected to humiliation and oppression. In this light, the term “homegrown” is misleading because it suggests that the reasons for radicalisation are purely domestic, whereas the hallmark of Islamist terrorism is its transnational nature.
Political factors clearly play a greater role in radicalisation than do religious ones. This is in marked contrast to the conventional view in the West that the prime motive for Islamist terrorism is religious. That erroneous assumption is seen by many Muslims as evidence of the West’s contempt for Islam. This sets up a vicious cycle that is liable to generate further radicalisation on both sides. Finally, there is the quantitative aspect. The number of potential terrorism recruits corresponds more or less to the percentage of the population in any western society likely to be involved in violent crime. In no sense do these people amount to a movement, let alone a mass movement.
Now back to the question of how best to respond to the phenomenon of homegrown terrorism. A distinction is often made between “hard” tools for combating terrorism –military measures – and “soft” tools such as strategies for intercultural dialogue. The slogan “war for Muslim hearts and minds” is a grotesque yet revealing attempt to link both sets of tools. Even when the intention of such interaction is to communicate a political message, an image of war is used.
This comes close to mounting a counteroffensive in the propaganda war initiated by Al-Qaeda. The first casualty of any such operation is likely to be the West’s own credibility – yet credibility is the key to successful communication. If we adopt the parlance employed by Al- Qaeda while at the same time proclaiming our intention to communicate with the whole Muslim world, we run the risk of reinforcing Al-Qaeda‘s message.
Such a response is hardly likely to alter the mindset of potential recruits. Their friends may take it as confirmation of their prejudices and that could trigger further radicalisation. The conclusion is that we should worry not just about homegrown terrorism, but also our response to it. The tendency to view Muslim grievances in one-dimensional terms reduces political discourse to a very simplistic level.
Our interactions with Muslims may be unconsciously influenced by this defensive reflex, and that may encourage equally defensive attitudes on their part.